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ANALYSIS OF A CERTAIN POLYCYCLIC-GROUP-BASED
CRYPTOSYSTEM
MATVEI KOTOV AND ALEXANDER USHAKOV
Abstract. We investigate security properties of the Anshel-Anshel-Goldfeld
commutator key-establishment protocol [1] used with certain polycyclic groups
described in [3]. We show that despite low success of the length based attack
shown in [5] the protocol can be broken by a deterministic polynomial-time
algorithm.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we analyze the commutator key-establishment protocol [1] used
with certain polycyclic groups described in [3]. The commutator key-establishment
(CKE) protocol is a two-party protocol performed as follows.
• Fix a group G (called the platform group) and a set of generators
g1, . . . , gk for G. All this information is made public.
• Alice prepares a tuple of elements a = (a1, . . . , aN1) called Alice’s public
tuple. Each ai is generated randomly as a product of gi’s and their inverses.
• Bob prepares a tuple of elements b = (b1, . . . , bN2) called the Bob’s public
tuple. Each bi is generated randomly as a product of gi’s and their inverses.
• Alice generates a random element A as a product aε1s1 . . . a
εL
sL
of ai’s and
their inverses. The element A (or more precisely its factorization) is called
the Alice’s private element.
• Bob generates a random element B as a product bδ1t1 . . . a
δL
tL
of bi’s and their
inverses, called the Bob’s private element.
• Alice publishes the tuple of conjugates b
A
= (A−1b1A, . . . , A
−1bN2A).
• Bob publishes the tuple of conjugates aB = (B−1a1B, . . . , B
−1aN1B).
• Finally, Alice computes the element KA as a product:
A−1 ·
(
B−1aε1s1B . . .B
−1aεLsLB
)
using the elements of Bob’s conjugate tuple aB .
• Bob computes the key KB as a product:(
A−1bδ1t1A . . .A
−1bδLtLA
)
−1
· B
using the elements of Alice’s conjugate tuple b
A
.
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It is easy to check that KA = KB = A
−1B−1AB in G. The obtained commutator
is the shared key.
Security of the commutator key establishment protocol is based on computational
hardness of computing the commutator [A,B] based on the intercepted public infor-
mation – the tuples a, b and their conjugates aB, b
A
. In practice it is often achieved
by solving systems of conjugacy equations for A and B, i.e., finding X = A′ and
Y = B′ satisfying:

X−1b1X = b
′
1,
. . .
X−1bN1X = b
′
N1
,
and


Y −1a1Y = a
′
1,
. . .
Y −1aN2Y = a
′
N1
,
and computing K ′ = [A′, B′]. In general it can happen that K ′ 6= K as explained
in [10], but as practice shows very often K = K ′ (for instance, as in [6]).
A big advantage of the commutator key-establishment protocol over other group-
based protocols is that it can be used with any group G satisfying certain compu-
tational properties. Originally, the group of braids Bn was suggested to use as a
platform group, but after a series of attacks it became clear that Bn can not pro-
vide good security. But the search for a good group is still very active and in [3] a
certain class of polycyclic groups was proposed to be used with CKE. In this paper
we show that that class can not provide good security. For more on group-based
cryptography see [9].
1.1. Outline. In Section 2 we define the class of groups under investigation and
discuss two different ways to represent the elements. In Sections 3 and 4 we describe
the attacks on different group presentations.
2. The platform group
Consider an irreducible monic polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] and define a field:
F = Q[x]/(f).
The ring of integers of F is defined as:
OF = {a ∈ F | a is a zero of a monic polynomial g(x) ∈ Z[x]}
and its group of units:
UF = {a | a
−1 ∈ OF }.
A semidirect product UF ⋉ OF of UF and OF is defined as a Cartesian product
UF ×OF equipped with the following binary operation:
(1) (α, a) · (β, b) = (αβ, aβ + b).
The constructed group GF is the platform group in [3]. It is easy to see that GF is
polycyclic and metabelian and there are several different ways to represent GF .
(a) One can work with GF as it is defined above, i.e., as a semidirect product,
in which case its elements are represented as pairs and multiplication (1) is
used.
(b) One can construct a polycyclic presentation for GF and work with its ele-
ments as with words over the generating set.
Unfortunately, neither [3] nor [5] give any detail on how to treat GF . Since com-
putational properties of the same group can vary depending on a way we represent
its elements, in the next sections we discuss both presentations of GF .
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2.1. GF as a set of pairs of matrices. There are different ways to represent
the elements of F . For instance, elements in F can be represented as polynomials
over Q of degree up to n − 1 with addition and multiplication performed modulo
the original polynomial f . Also one can represent elements in F by matrices as
described below. Recall that the companion matrix for a monic polynomial
f = xn + cn−1x
n−1 + . . .+ c1x+ c0 is a matrix of the form:
M =


0 0 . . . 0 −c0
1 0 . . . 0 −c1
0 1 . . . 0 −c2
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 . . . 1 −cn−1


The characteristic and minimal polynomial of M is f and the set of matrices:
(2) F =
{
a0E + a1M + a2M
2 + . . .+ an−1M
n−1 | a0, . . . , an−1 ∈ Q
}
.
equipped with the usual matrix addition and multiplication is the field F . The
correspondence between two presentations is obvious:
a0 + a1x+ . . .+ an−1x
n−1 ←→ a0 + a1M + . . .+ an−1M
n−1
and choosing a particular presentation we do not change computational properties
of F . Here we choose matrix presentation for F .
Let O1, . . . , On be a basis of the ring of integers OF , where each Oi is a matrix.
Hence:
OF = {a1O1 + a2O2 + . . .+ anOn | a1, . . . , an ∈ Z} .
Let {U1, . . . , Um} be a generating set for the group UF , where every Ui is a matrix.
Hence:
UF = {U
a1
1 · U
a2
2 · . . . · U
am
m | a1, . . . , am ∈ Z} .
By Dirichlet theorem [7, Chapter 8] UF ∼= Zk × Z
m−1, where m = s + t − 1, s is
the number of real field monomorphisms F → R, and 2t is the number of complex
field monomorphisms F → C. Without loss of generality it can be assumed that
Uk1 = E.
Now naturally the group GF = UF ⋉OF is a set of pairs of matrices:
G = {(C, S) |C ∈ UF , S ∈ OF },
equipped with multiplication given by:
(3) (C, S) · (D,T ) = (CD,SD + T ).
It is easy to check that the inverse in UF ⋉OF can be computed as
(4) (C, S)−1 = (C−1,−SC−1),
which gives the following expression for the conjugate of (B, T ) by (C, S)
(5) (D,T )(C,S) = (C, S)−1(D,T )(C, S) = (D,S(E −D) + TC),
where E is the identity matrix.
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2.2. GF given by polycyclic presentation. Recall that a group G is called
polycyclic if there exists a subnormal series of G:
G = G0 ⊲G2 ⊲G3 . . .⊲Gn = {1},
with cyclic factors Gi−1/Gi. Denote [Gi−1 : Gi] by ri and put I = {i | ri < ∞}.
Relative to the series above one can find a generating set g1, . . . , gn for G satisfying
〈Gi, gi〉 = Gi−1. Every element g ∈ G can be uniquely expressed as a product
g = ge11 . . . g
en
n , where ei ∈ Z, i = 1, . . . , n, and 0 ≤ ei < ri if i ∈ I. The polycyclic
group G has a finite presentation of the form:
(6) G =
〈
g1, . . . , gn
∣∣∣∣ ggij = wij , gg
−1
i
j = vij for 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n,
grkk = uk for k ∈ I
〉
,
where wij , vij , and ui are words in gi+1, . . . , gn. This presentation is called a
polycyclic presentation. For more details see [7, Chapter 8].
It is straightforward to find a polycyclic presentation for the group GF = UF ⋉
OF . It has generators g1, . . . , gm, gm+1, . . . , gm+n, where g1, . . . , gm correspond to
the pairs (U1, O), . . . , (Um, O) ∈ UF⋉OF (O is the zero matrix), and gm+1, . . . , gm+n
correspond to the pairs (E,O1), . . . , (E,On) ∈ UF ⋉OF (E is the identity matrix).
The set of relations for G is formed as follows.
• ggim+j = g
aij1
m+1 . . . g
aijn
m+n, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, and aij1, . . . , aijn are the
coefficients in the expression OjUi = aij1O1 + . . .+ aijnOn,
• g
g
−1
i
m+j = g
bij1
m+1 . . . g
bijn
m+n, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , n, and aij1, . . . , bijn are the
coefficients in the expression OjU
−1
i = bij1O1 + . . .+ bijnOn,
• gk1 = e,
• [gi, gj] = e, 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m,
• [gi, gj] = e, m+ 1 ≤ i < j ≤ m+ n.
3. Attack on semidirect product
In this section we assume that the group GF is given as a semidirect product and
the field F is described using matrices as in (2). The general idea behind the attack
is to extend the group GF and work in G
∗
F = F
∗⋉F . The group G∗F is, in general,
not finitely generated and hence is not polycyclic. Nevertheless the elements of G∗
can be effectively represented by pairs of matrices as described in Section 2.1.
Consider a system of conjugacy equations related to the Alice’s private key:
(7)


X−1b1X = b
′
1,
. . .
X−1bN2X = b
′
N2
,
with unknown X ∈ UF ⋉ OF . We treat the system as a system over F
∗ ⋉ F and
hence:
X = (C, S), bi = (Bi, Ti), b
′
i = (B
′
i, T
′
i ) in F
∗ ⋉ F.
Using (5) we get the following system of N2 linear equations over the field F with
two unknowns C and S:
(8)


S(E −B1) + T1C = T
′
1,
...
S(E −BN2) + TN2C = T
′
N2
.
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It has a unique solution when the coefficient matrix of the system has rank 2 over
the field F , in which case the obtained solution A′ is the same as the original Alice’s
private key. We call the described approach “field based attack” or simply FBA.
The described attack was implemented in GAP [4]. Its implementation can be
found in [8]. The table below compares success rate and time efficiency of our
attack and the attack in [5]. Our tests were run on Intel Core i5 1.80GHz computer
with 4GB of RAM, Ububtu 12.04, GAP 4.7.
Polynomial h(G)
LBA w/ dynamic
FBA, L = 5 FBA, L = 100
set, L = 5
Time
Success
Time
Success
Time
Success
rate rate rate
x2 − x− 1 3 0.20 h 100% 2.4 s 100% 2.8 s 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 76.87 h 35% 3.4 s 100% 5.3 s 100%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 94.43 h 8% 5.2 s 100% 9.7 s 100%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 95.18 h 5% 23.1 s 100% 57.7 s 100%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 95.05 h 5% 15.3 s 100% 29.5 s 100%
x15 − x− 2 22 – – 694.8 s 100% 607.4 s 100%
x20 − x− 1 30 – – 208.5 s 100% 192.8 s 100%
The first four columns of this table are taken from [5]. For our tests we used the
same parameter values: N1 = N2 = 20, and the same number of tests: 100.
4. Attack on polycyclic presentation
In this section we assume that GF is given by a polycyclic presentation described
in Section 2.2. First we show that the group GF can be presented as a semidirect
product of an abelian matrix group and Zn. Then we present the attack on the
obtained presentation.
4.1. Deduced semidirect product for GF . Given a polycyclic presentation for
GF constructed in Section 2.2 it is straightforward to find the numbers m and n.
For the relations:
ggim+j = g
aij1
m+1 . . . g
aijn
m+n
we can define matrices C1, . . . , Cm:
Ci = (aijk)
k=1,...,n
j=1,...,n .
Next we form a semidirect product G of 〈C1, . . . , Cm〉 and Z
n which is a set of
pairs:
{(C, s) | C ∈ 〈C1, . . . , Cm〉, s ∈ Z
n}
equipped with the multiplication given by
(C, s) · (D, t) = (CD, sD + t).
Let {e1, . . . , en} be the standard basis for Z
n. It is easy to check the map τ : {g1, . . . , gm+n} →
G given by:
τ(gi) =
{
(Ci, 0) if i ≤ m,
(E, ej) if i = m+ j, 1 ≤ j ≤ n,
defines an isomorphism between GF and the constructed group. Furthermore, given
an element g = ge11 . . . g
en
n it requires polynomial time to find its τ -image.
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We also claim that given a pair (C, v) it requires polynomial time to find a
word g such that τ(g) = (C, v). To convert (C, v) into a word in the generators
g1, . . . , gm+n one can express (C, v) as a product:
(C, v) = (C1, 0)
a1 . . . (Cm, 0)
am(E, e1)
am+1 . . . (E, en)
am+n ,
for some a1, . . . , an+m ∈ Z, in which case g = g
a1
1 . . . g
an
n g
am+1
m+1 . . . g
am+n
m+n . Clearly
(C, v) = (C, 0)(E, v). Therefore we have to solve two tasks. First, we need to find
a1, . . . , am such that C = C
a1
1 . . . C
am
m which can be done in polynomial time [2].
Second, we need to find am+1, . . . , am+n such that v = am+1e1 + . . . + am+nen
which is obvious.
It follows from the discussion above that computational problems for GF given
by polycyclic presentation and by the deduced semidirect product are polynomial
time equivalent. Another important property of the computed presentation is that
the ring:
K = Q[C1, . . . , Cm]
generated by matrices C1, . . . Cm is actually a field isomorphic to a subfield of F
(because Ci’s define the same action as Ui’s, but in a basis O1, . . . , On).
4.2. The attack. In the deduced presentation of GF the system of conjugacy
equations (7) is equivalent to the following system of equations with unknown
C ∈ K∗ and v ∈ Zn:
(9)


v(E −B1) + t1C = t
′
1,
...
v(E −BN2) + tN2C = t
′
N2
,
where (C, v) representsX , (B, ti) represents bi, (B, t
′
i) represents b
′
i for i = 1, . . . , N2.
To solve the system (9) we compute a basis H1, . . . , Hl of the field K as a vector
space over Q. Hence,
C = c1H1 + . . .+ clHl
for some c1, . . . , cn ∈ Q and (9) can be rewritten as:


v(E −B1) + c1t1H1 + . . .+ clt1Hl = t
′
1,
...
v(E −BN2) + c1tN2H1 + . . .+ cltN2Hl = t
′
N2
,
which is a system of linear equations over field Q with unknown v = (v1, . . . , vn)
and c1, . . . , cl ∈ Q. The solution of this system provides us with the key A
′.
We call this procedure as FBA2. The attack also was implemented in GAP and
tested on the same machine. The table bellow contains results of our tests.
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Polynomial h(G)
FBA2, L = 5 FBA2, L = 100
Time
Success
Time
Success
rate rate
x2 − x− 1 3 4.3 s 100% 3.9 s 100%
x5 − x3 − 1 7 4.9 s 100% 6.8 s 100%
x7 − x3 − 1 10 8.1 s 100% 10.1 s 100%
x9 − 7x3 − 1 14 34.0 s 100% 47.7 s 100%
x11 − x3 − 1 16 20.9 s 100% 26.4 s 100%
x15 − x− 2 22 528.2 s 100% 761.3 s 100%
x20 − x− 1 30 164.6 s 100% 208.2 s 100%
5. Conclusion
Our arguments show the following.
• The groups of the form UF ⋉OF can not be used as platform groups in the
commutator key-establishment protocol.
• It is difficult to devise a successful length-based-attack and low success rate
does not mean much in terms of security.
Finally we want to point out that our attack does not eliminate all polycyclic groups
from consideration.
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